What is the value of youth engagement to socio-economic advocacy?

Up until the 17 October Revolution, and despite Lebanon’s dynamic history of civil society movements and activity, there have only been a few occasions where Lebanese civil society actors and volunteers have extensively mobilized in the name of socio-economic justice. Instead, divisive party politics and what are deemed to be far more pressing issues related to the provision of basic services, civil rights and freedoms, and state corruption have been placed at the forefront of public and advocacy agendas. This is especially true in rural, more homogeneous areas outside of Beirut and other major Lebanese cities such as Tripoli, Sour, Saida, and Aley. In the absence of policy change and institutional reform, many of these issues are taken in the hands of Lebanon’s next-generation of leaders – the Lebanese youth of today
– who act through the private sector, institutions i.e. schools, and NGOs. Since the popular uprising began on October 17, Lebanese youth have been at the forefront of the revolt demanding social and economic reforms, and establishing themselves as the cornerstone of the Revolution.

Despite the Lebanese youth’s extensive history in activism and mobilization, the Lebanese state has never prioritized youth in public policy. Notably, there have been three surges of youth mobilization in Lebanon. The first surge spanned from the year 1990, during the phase of post-civil war and early reconstruction to 1996, and was marked by the establishment of interest-based NGOs going against the values of dominant identity-based NGOs. Activism in the years following the civil war primarily focused on political and civil rights, as organizers were often secular and believed that achieving strides in attaining such rights could set precedents for further change.

The second surge occurred after the 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and lasted up until the 2009 national elections. During this period, a number of activists and NGOs, often times labeled as “alternative NGOs,” were born. These alternative NGOs focused on citizenship, conflict resolution, and social cohesion, working against politically affiliated, communal NGOs, and prioritizing the agendas of international donors. Simultaneously, activists fought against sectarianism and focused on transforming election law to reflect proportional representation. This period also included alternative NGOs, heavily comprised of volunteers, who worked on humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and peacebuilding after the 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon, and the 2008 quasi-civil war in Beirut. However, the 2009 election law reinforced the roles of the current political establishment, forcing advocates to largely lose hope. Thus, NGOs working on citizenship dwindled or changed focus to align with international donor agendas that mainly aimed to create short-term peace and development on the premise of immediate relief and impact.

The third surge in youth mobilization came in 2011, with the Arab Spring and waves of protests surrounding issues such as the waste crisis, corruption, and personal freedoms.1 As part of this, the 2015 protests that took place in Lebanon emerged out of a waste-crisis movement and into an anti-corruption effort that made accountable the physical crisis of waste to the existing Lebanese politicians. Since then, civil society advocacy has evolved in approach. As opposed to addressing rights-based concerns, development-advocacy initiatives, etc., from the out-side-in, civil society actors have begun challenging the political norm by running for elections in hopes of combating social injustice from the in-side-out. Thus, the civil society ecosystem has been riddled with fragmented opinions regarding the approach needed to address Lebanese issues, with the May 2018 Parliamentary Elections at the center of this divide as many candidates ran under the premise of representing “civil society.”

Decades of endemic corruption, economic decadence , and poor infrastructure were faced by amorphous attempts of mobilizations. The Revolutionof October 17, where hundreds of thousands of Lebanese took to the streets calling for change, marks the beginning of a new path in Lebanon’s history of civil mobilization. The protests have brought together Lebanese across political, sectarian and factional lines from all over the country’s regions. The rare national solidarity broke the sectarian and regional divisions in the country and has established a national cohesion, class and gender awareness, with the Lebanese women being at the forefront of the protests. Since the popular uprising began, thousands of Lebanese took to the streets, reclaiming public spaces, celebrating a rare national unity, discussing the most pressing issues affecting their life and organizing activities such as strikes, banks targeting etc... The choice of spaces confirms the major urban dysfunctions in Lebanon, one of the many aspects of the state's failure in the country. As they are essential to build the relationship among citizens, the public spaces today became the cornerstone of the demands of the demonstrators.

Students and young Lebanese breathed new life into the movement by rallying around the cause and establishing themselves as the spearhead of the revolution.
In a country where voting rights are set at 21, young people have never been a significant issue for the ruling class; With over 35% of young people between the age of 18 and 25 are unemployed2, where the education system is steeped in inequality, young Lebanese people are the main victims of the current socio-economic crisis .

The young Lebanese are now less involved in divisive party politics, and more involved in social justice, and want to be considered as accountable citizens.

Among the forms and topics covered within advocacy efforts, little work in the socio- economic sphere has been addressed through civil mobilization. This not only affects the lack of fiscal reform, thereby perpetuating economic instability within the country, but ultimately adds to a growing inequality gap. Additionally, the shortage of citizen accountability and ownership over domestic policy issues contributes to a variance in the spaces occupied by different civil society actors in Lebanon. While there is an increasing number of NGOs working with the youth within the country, a lot of work remains to be done in terms of supporting the youth in their movements to become more resilient and sustainable in their pursuit of an equitable system. Unfortunately, many individuals working in the scope of civil society activism are motivated by self- serving purposes related but not limited to independent career advancement and growth, global employment experience, resume-boosts from a humanitarian angle, self-fulfillment (i.e. fulfilling a “feel good” factor), and access to exclusive communities for purposes other than employment. Contrastingly, the mobilizations of October 2019, created a wave of young civil society actors authentically interested in justice, rights- based advocacy and socio-economic justice. Today, the reality of the 17 October Revolution does not resemble any previous movement in the history of Lebanese mobilizations, it has already achieved a lot more than just the resignation of a government. It also introduced new citizenship values to the Lebanese society such as inclusion, transparency, accountability and ownership. However, the latest events have left the country in an arguably even more delicate political situation than before, hence the need to guide and solidify the new attained values in order to build and engage with policy processes. Youth-led movements are unable to access sustainable networks and resources to develop their technical capacity and engage with political systems. By supporting youth engagement and involvement in civil society advocacy, we may support their movement in becoming more sustainable and resilient to any challenges and barriers their activism may face, targeting topics such as development, rights-based advocacy, and of course, socio-economic justice.