



Warnings: Death's Gifts Wrapped in Life

A human rights and humanitarian reading of the database on
Israeli evacuation orders and warnings in Lebanon

March — June 2026





Prepared by

Ahmad Mroueh

Translated by

Zeina Assi

Graphic Design

Mostafa Fayyad

The Socio-Economic Justice Initiative- MAAN, is an independent non-profit Lebanese think act initiative, established in 2018. It works to address social and economic issues in Lebanon by producing evidence-based qualitative and quantitative research and developing public policy recommendations.

MAAN seeks to reduce inequalities and advance social and economic justice by fostering a culture of accountability and civic participation, supporting the development of stronger institutions and more effective social protection systems through a rights based approach. It also works to connect grassroots groups and local communities with policymakers, helping translate citizens' needs and challenges into practical, actionable policies and solutions.



Sodeco Beirut, Petro Trad Street, Sodeco 4, 6th floor



@maan_think_act_tank



maan-lb.org



info@maan-lb.org



+961 70 669 241



@The Socio-Economic Justice Initiative - MAAN



Scan to view
our portfolio.

Table of Contents

Key Findings	4
Introduction	5
Methodology	6
I. The Legal Framework: What the Law Says, and Where it Falls Short	7
A- The Stated Purpose and the Practice on the Ground	7
B- A Warning Is Not a License	8
C- The Limits of Article 0V in Light of the Data	8
D- When the Warning Becomes a Weapon	9
II. What the Numbers Reveal: Patterns and Significance	10
A- Types of Warnings and their Timing	10
B- Center and Periphery: Two Patterns of Targeting	12
B.1- The Center — Beirut’s Southern Suburb (Dahiyeh)	12
B.2- The Periphery: The Villages of the South, Nabatieh, and the Bekaa	13
C- Warning Bundles: Engineering Panic Wholesale and Retail	14
D- “Immediately”: The Word that Undermines Effectiveness	14
E- The Warning After the “Truce”: Barring Return as Continuing	15
Conclusion	18
Appendix: Warning Distribution Tables	20

Key Findings

- Between March 2 and June 18, 2026, the Israeli occupation army issued 233 distinct warnings, generating 1097 evacuation, movement-restriction, and return-restriction orders across 286 identified villages and locations.
- 88% of all recorded cases (967 of 1097) ordered the evacuation of entire neighborhoods, villages, residential blocks, or geographic areas, rather than warning residents about a specific military target. Only 53 warnings (5%) referred to a particular building or identified site.
- None of the 1097 recorded orders directed residents to a shelter, reception center, or designated safe corridor. The only three destinations ever mentioned were open ground at least one kilometer away (253 warnings), areas north of the Zahrani River (175 warnings), and the direction of Sidon (16 warnings).
- 89% of all village-level warnings were issued as collective announcements covering several locations at once at an average of approximately 9 locations each, rather than warnings issued to one location at a time. The largest single announcement covered 56 areas simultaneously.
- A single neighborhood — Haret Hreik, in Beirut's southern suburbs, received 28 warnings. Three other neighborhoods in the same area were each warned 22 times by early April, before the first announced truce.
- Habbouch, in Nabatieh district, received warnings in every month covered by the report, from March through June.
- Every recorded evacuation order required residents to leave «immediately.» None provided a clearly defined period in which to evacuate, identified a safe-route, or mentioned specific arrangements for sick people, older persons, or persons with disabilities.
- The April 17 and 20 «truce» announcements simultaneously imposed movement-and-return restrictions on 59 named villages. Overall, 66 such restriction or barred-return orders were issued in a ten-day span (April 17–26), accounting for 32% of all cases recorded that month, compared to zero in March and May.
- The final entry in the database, dated 18 June, was not an evacuation order but the declaration of a “security zone” covering seven border towns. It completed a documented progression from ordering residents to leave, to preventing their return, and finally to imposing a new security reality over evacuated Lebanese territory.

Introduction

This report provides a comprehensive and systematic record of the evacuation orders and warnings issued by the Israeli occupation army in Lebanon between March and June 2026. Rather than relying on a sample or focusing only on incidents that received extensive media coverage, it seeks to document every warning that could be collected and verified during the period under review.

The methodology is based on exhaustive documentation. Warnings were collected from their original sources, verified, entered into a unified database, and then analyzed chronologically, geographically, and by type. The database contains 233 distinct announcements, 228 of which were issued as “immediate warnings,” while the remainder took other forms. Because some announcements covered more than one village or location, the total number of documented warning cases reached 1097, affecting 286 villages and locations.

Based on the information and sources reviewed, this database is among the most comprehensive records of the warning system used during this period. Its value lies in the fact that it does not rest on selected cases, but on the full body of announcements that could be documented, providing a solid basis for analyzing the patterns, distribution, and effects of the warnings.

Beyond the formal language and the military and political calculations of this cursed war, this report stands unequivocally with the people: with everyone whose home was threatened and whose sense of safety was taken from them, whether on grounds claimed to be justified or otherwise. It does not seek to pass judgement. It seeks instead to restore meaning and human weight to these dry figures. Behind every record lie rights, homes, families, memories, and a sense of safety.

The documented facts raise questions that are difficult to ignore. Were military activities or military objectives actually present in every location placed under warning? If so, were residents aware of them? And where no such activity or objective existed, what purpose was served by targeting and destroying homes with missiles that cost more than the homes themselves? The report does not speculate about intent. It leaves these legitimate questions, in a time of oppression, to the reader's judgement and confines itself to presenting the tangible facts on the ground.

It is important to clarify the scope and limits of this work. The report focuses on documenting the warnings in their various forms. It does not determine, in every case, whether a warning was followed by an actual strike, nor does the database provide a comprehensive record of casualties or damage resulting from the attacks. The subject of the study is the warning itself, treated as an act in its own right, one that produces immediate effects from the moment it is issued, regardless of whether the threat is later carried out.

The importance of this distinction becomes particularly clear in cases where no strike followed the warning. The warnings issued for Beirut's southern suburbs on 9 April, for example, were not followed by attacks. Yet their issuance alone was enough to have an immediate impact on residents.

Linguistically, the Cairo Arabic Language Academy defines a warning as “a threat and notification that an event is imminent.”¹ Its human meaning, however, reaches far beyond this abstract

1- Cairo Arabic Language Academy, entry “al-Inzar” (Warning): <https://www.arabicacademy.gov.eg/ar/البحث/الإنذار>

definition. It is an announcement that a source of safety, belonging, love, and memory may be erased for people of flesh and blood.

This edition of the report includes two sections that were not part of the initial analysis: a methodology section explaining how the warnings were collected from their original sources and how the database was built; and a legal section drawing on two interviews with specialists in international law to place the findings within the framework of Article 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and examine the limits of its application in practice.

What follows is a reading of the data: how are the warnings distributed across time, geography, and type? What do their patterns and effects reveal? And how does international law read them?

Methodology

The database was built from primary-source material: the Arabic-language warning notices published by the spokesperson of the Israeli occupation army. The notices were collected as they appeared and archived by the Socio-Economic Justice Initiative – MAAN. No press reports or secondary compilations were used as substitutes for the original material. Every database entry is linked to the source image from which it was drawn, saved under a file name recording the date of publication and its sequence within that day.

The database was structured so that every village or location named in a warning appears as a separate entry. Where a single announcement covered twenty towns, for example, each town was entered on its own row, while a shared identifier linked all twenty records back to the same original announcement. This makes it possible to analyze the material at two levels: the announcement itself, and each village or location covered by it.

The two “truce” announcements issued on 17 and 20 April were recorded using the same approach. They were included because, as the report later shows, they did more than announce a pause in hostilities: they also imposed restrictions on movement and barred residents from returning to specified areas.

The limits of the dataset are as important as its findings. It does not establish whether every warning was followed by an actual strike, nor does it provide a comprehensive count of deaths, injuries, or damage caused by the hostilities. Its focus is the warning itself: an event with consequences that begin the moment it is issued, whether or not the threatened attack later takes place.

Separate data documented by the Initiative nevertheless points to the wider scale of violence. Between March 2 and June 18, more than 5,600 bombing operations were recorded across Lebanon, alongside more than 4,300 casualties during the same period. A “bombing operation” does not necessarily refer to a single missile or drone. It may consist of one strike or several strikes carried out at the same location or as part of the same attack. On this basis, the number of documented bombing operations was approximately five times greater than the number of warning cases.

The report also draws on three specialist interviews. Two addressed the legal dimensions of the

warnings and were conducted with attorney Farouk Moghrabi and Professor Ali Sweidan. These interviews were not intended to canvass general opinion. They were designed to answer two specific questions: what legal function are these warnings formally meant to serve, and does issuing them alter the legal obligations of the attacking party? Their responses are reproduced with their explicit consent and form the basis of the legal analysis that follows.

The third interview was conducted with psychologist Rima Ibrahim. It explored the psychological dimensions of the warnings and their impact on people's sense of safety, mental well-being, and morale. That analysis is developed later in the section "When the Warning Becomes a Weapon."

I. The Legal Framework: What the Law Says, and Where it Falls Short

The legal justification commonly invoked for these warnings rests on Article 57(2)(c) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions², which requires the attacking party to give "effective advance warning of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit."

The provision is brief. Yet in contemporary military discourse, it is often treated as a broad legal shield for evacuation orders and for the attacks that follow them. The two legal interviews conducted for this report return the article to its proper scope: they clarify what obligations it imposes, and what it cannot be used to justify.

A- The Stated Purpose and the Practice on the Ground

Attorney Farouk Moghrabi³ explains that the stated legal purpose of these warnings is to limit or reduce the risk of harm to civilians. Residents are meant to be notified in advance of an attack on a military target so that they can have an opportunity to move away from the area of danger. In legal terms, the object of the attack is therefore presumed to be a military installation or objective, not the civilian population itself.

Moghrabi argues, however, that the practice on the ground has followed a different course. Whatever protective function such warnings are supposed to serve in law, they have in practice been used as a means of forced displacement, with residents ordered to leave their homes without any clear and specific justification being provided for each warning.

The database supports this assessment with concrete figures rather than general impressions. Across the **1097 documented warning cases**, not one referred residents to a shelter, reception center, or secured safe corridor. The destinations mentioned were limited to three formulations: **"open ground" one kilometer away** in 253 cases, **"north of the Zahrani River"** in 175 cases, and **"towards the Sidon District"** in 16 cases.

"Open ground" on a night of war cannot reasonably be treated as a safe destination. It does not identify a place of protection; it merely orders residents away from one place without offering

2- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I), Article 57(2)(c): <https://nhrcib.org/protocol-additional-geneva-conventions-12-august-1949>

3- Interview conducted by "MAAN" with attorney and human rights advocate Farouk Moghrabi, on the concept of warnings in international law and their application in Lebanon during the 2026 war.

them a clear alternative.

B- A Warning Is Not a License

Professor Ali Sweidan⁴ sets out a fundamental principle through which the rest of this report should be read: the warnings issued by Israel to residents in Lebanon do not, in themselves, amount to a “license” to attack. Even after a warning has been issued, the attacking party remains bound by the applicable rules of international humanitarian law, including the obligation to:

- distinguish between civilians and civilian objects, on the one hand, and military objectives, on the other;
- respect the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks expected to cause civilian harm that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
- take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians;
- provide an effective warning that gives civilians a genuine opportunity to leave;
- allow sufficient time for evacuation and ensure that safe routes are available for civilians to move away from danger.

Sweidan concludes that such notices may serve as advance warnings of an attack or as evacuation orders, and therefore form part of the precautionary measures recognized under international humanitarian law. Their issuance, however, does not in itself establish whether the attack that follows is lawful or unlawful.

This conclusion cuts through the propagandistic use of Article 57 in military discourse: a warning does not automatically condemn an attack, but neither does it automatically absolve the attacker

C- The Limits of Article 57 in Light of the Data

Read alongside the 1097 warnings, the two legal interviews bring into focus four practical limits in the application of Article 57 that its brief wording does not itself spell out:

- The text does not define what makes a warning effective. The data shows that several elements necessary for practical effectiveness were often absent. Evacuation orders were issued in immediate terms, without a defined time window, assembly points, or maps of safe routes except in rare cases. If effectiveness, as Sweidan argues, requires giving civilians “a genuine opportunity to leave,” it is difficult to reconcile that standard with the word “immediately,” which appears at the head of hundreds of warnings.
- A warning does not strip protection from civilians who remain. Failure to comply with an evacuation order does not turn a civilian into a combatant or deprive them of the protection afforded by international humanitarian law. The equation adopted by the Israeli military—under which those who remain after a warning are treated as having forfeited protection—turns the logic of the provision on its head. Article 57 adds a precaution for the benefit of civilians; it does not remove their civilian status. A sick person, an older person, or someone without transport or the means to bear the cost of displacement does not lose civilian protection simply because they did not leave.

4- Interview conducted by “MAAN” with a lawyer from the Strategic Litigation Unit at The Legal Agenda, on the legal status of advance warnings and the attacking party’s obligations following their issuance.

- A warning does not transfer the burden of protection to the people at risk. Article 57, across its six paragraphs, is directed primarily at the attacking party and sets out the obligations and precautions incumbent upon it. Turning the provision into a sequence of commands addressed to residents—leave, do not move, do not return—reverses the logic of the text and shifts responsibility for protection from the attacker to those exposed to danger.
- Repeated warnings not followed by an attack raise questions about their precautionary function. The data documents locations warned dozens of times, as well as warnings that were not followed by an actual strike, including those issued for the southern Metn coast on April 9. When warnings are repeated, or become detached from the attack they are supposed to precede, their protective function is weakened and they may instead keep residents in a state of persistent fear and anticipation.

D- When the Warning Becomes a Weapon

More than two thousand years ago, Sun Tzu wrote that “the greatest victory is the one achieved without fighting”, and that the purpose of an attack is not merely to tear down walls, but to break the adversary’s will and throw society into disarray before armies even arrive.⁵The pattern of Israeli warnings documented between March and June 2026 brings this logic to mind, recast through the instruments of the present: technology, the language of international law, and advance evacuation warnings.

For years, evacuation warnings were presented as a precautionary measure intended to move civilians out of harm’s way in accordance with international humanitarian law. Yet an analysis of **1097 warning cases** affecting Lebanese towns and cities, generated by **233 distinct announcements**, reveals a different picture. Here, the warning does more than notify. It becomes a mechanism that produces displacement, legitimizes destruction, and reshapes geography under the pressure of threat. In Sun Tzu’s strategic terms, it is the breaking of a society before the first shot is fired.

Psychologist Rima Ibrahim describes this impact in deeply human terms. In her view, a warning is not a passing procedure:

“The warning strikes the person before it strikes the stone. A home, in psychological terms, is not merely a set of walls; it is the place from which a person draws a sense of safety. Someone given only minutes to leave begins experiencing loss before the first shell falls, mourning a place that is still standing.”

Ibrahim captures the ordeal in a single scene: a mother standing before her lifetime, forced within minutes to decide what should be saved, the children’s photographs, the documents of the house, or the grandmother’s medicine.

“That decision alone is a wound, whatever is carried and whatever is left behind.”

The experience is harsher still in southern Lebanon because new fear reawakens old fear. Those who have lived through the history of conflict between Lebanon and Israel, from the 1978 invasion to the 2024 war, “do not hear the new warning with an untouched ear; they hear it through a burdened memory.” A former displacement is relived in the midst of a new one.

5- “The Art of War,” a classical Chinese military treatise authored by the strategist and general Sun Tzu in the sixth century BCE. It is considered one of the foremost references on strategy, holding that true victory comes through intelligent planning, deception, resource management, and the avoidance of direct confrontation.

The anxiety is not confined to individuals. Entire villages wait for their turn, and a single notification on a phone may overturn the life of a family. Waiting itself is exhausting. Someone who sleeps alert to the sound of a phone and checks the news every hour lives in a state of permanent vigilance that wears down both body and nerves, even when the warning never reaches their own home.

Here, the psychological analysis converges with the data: collective warnings issued to dozens of villages at once, and locations warned repeatedly without any attack following. In this way, everyone—those directly warned and those still waiting—remains in the same waiting room.

Ibrahim pays particular attention to children and older people:

“A child carried from bed at night may not have the words to understand what is happening. The body may instead store the experience as anxiety, disrupted sleep, and a fearful attachment to the parents.”

An older person who built a home stone by stone may lose with it “the entire reel of a lifetime, and may wither after displacement in a way that age alone cannot explain.”

Even so, Ibrahim rejects reducing people to the image of helpless victims. Returning to the rubble, which may appear to an outsider as stubbornness, can instead be “an act of healing and an attempt to reclaim some control over a life that had almost been taken away entirely.”

But resilience does not, on its own, heal trauma. People—children in particular—need organized psychological support that begins in schools and extends beyond shelter centers. They also need safe spaces in which to speak about what they have lived through, rather than being met only with admiration for their ability to endure.

II. What the Numbers Reveal: Patterns and Significance

A- Types of Warnings and their Timing




Chart 1 — Categories of Warning Records (1,096 records, March–June 2026)

Of the 1097 warnings cases, 967 - 88% were geographic-spatial evacuation. They covered entire neighborhoods, villages, or residential blocks, using formulations such as “move one thousand meters away,” “relocate north of the Zahrani River,” or “head towards the Sidon District.”

By contrast, only 53 cases referred to a specific target or building. A further 73 cases involved restrictions on movement or declarations of restricted areas, while 3 cases concerned infrastructure or maritime waters.




Chart 2 — Daily Rhythm of Warning Logs — Intermittent Escalation Without a Fixed Pattern

This distribution shows a clear preference for warning broad geographic areas rather than limiting the orders to identified targets. It therefore calls into question the claim of “precision warfare.” When the overwhelming majority of warnings encompass entire neighborhoods, villages, or localities, their impact can no longer be understood as confined to a building suspected of military use. It extends to the place itself and to everyone living within it.




Chart 3 — Monthly Distribution — March: The Initial Shock, May: A Second Wave

The evacuation of an entire area may, under the logic applied by the Israeli military, lead to its treatment as a “free-fire zone,” on the assumption that anything remaining within it has become a legitimate target and that homes and infrastructure have lost their protection. As Sweidan explains, that reasoning has no sound legal basis. A warning does not relieve the attacking party

of its obligations of distinction and proportionality, nor does it strip civilians or civilian objects of their legal protection.

The warnings were also unevenly distributed over time, tracing a jagged pattern closer to a heart-rate monitor: sharp surges followed by periods of relative decline. On March 2 alone, 23 separate warnings were issued. The following day, the number of evacuation warnings rose to 116, the highest daily total recorded during the four-month period. Smaller waves followed on April 6, May 26, and in mid-June.

These fluctuations raise questions about the factors shaping the timing and intensity of the warnings. Some peaks coincided with political developments and stalled negotiations. Establishing a direct relationship between the two, however, would require further chronological and political analysis. What is clear is that civilians bore the immediate consequences of each wave through displacement, fear, and the disruption of daily life.

B- Center and Periphery: Two Patterns of Targeting

One of the most significant findings to emerge from the data analysis was the geographic reclassification of the warnings. In the original notices, many locations were grouped under the broad label "South Lebanon." Once the location field was disaggregated and the sites reassigned to their respective districts and governorates, two distinct patterns emerged depending on location.

B.1: The Center —Beirut's Southern Suburb (Dahiyeh)

At the center, the warnings were concentrated within a relatively small geographic area. A total of 158 warning cases concerned Beirut and its southern suburbs, with the same locations appearing repeatedly: Haret Hreik 28 times; Ghobeiry, Burj al-Barajneh, and Hadath 22 times each; Chiyah 20 times; Laylaki 19 times; and Tahwit al-Ghadr 18 times.

This repetition within a densely populated and geographically confined area produced effects extending well beyond the buildings directly targeted. An evacuation warning issued in a crowded neighborhood close to the capital does not affect only the residents immediately concerned. It can trigger waves of displacement, severe traffic congestion, and wider economic and social pressure on the city and its services, striking at the nerve center of the state. In this area, broad geographic evacuation orders overlapped with warnings concerning specific buildings or locations, magnifying their impact on residents and on movement within and around the capital.

The timing is equally significant. All 28 warnings concerning Haret Hreik were issued in March and April, after which they stopped. By 9 April, before the announcement of the first "truce," the center, and the southern suburbs in particular, had effectively been neutralized and emptied.

The high concentration of warnings across the southern suburbs therefore did not mark the beginning of this process so much as the consolidation of an existing reality of neutralization and depopulation. The truces and negotiations that followed then served to entrench that reality.

Meanwhile, the south continued to bear the burden of warnings and their aftermath throughout the four months covered by the report. Habbouch alone was warned in every month from March to June, without any of the actors who had contributed to the neutralization of the southern suburbs intervening to halt the bloodshed in the south.

B.2: The Periphery: The Villages of the South, Nabatieh, and the Bekaa




Chart 4 —Top 18 Most Warned Locations

At the periphery, the pattern was reversed. Individual villages did not recur with the same frequency recorded in Beirut's southern suburbs, yet the overall scale remained immense: 938 geographically confirmed warning cases were spread across hundreds of villages in the governorates of South Lebanon, Nabatieh, and the Bekaa.

It is important to clarify that the expression “villages of the south” does not refer only to localities explicitly named in the warnings. When an order is addressed to an entire district, its effect extends to the villages within it. The actual number of affected localities may therefore be far greater than the number individually named in the database.

Warnings tied to specific targets all but disappear in these areas, while broad geographic evacuation dominates. Its effect extends beyond psychological pressure to repeated, large-scale emptying of villages and towns. Habbouch was warned 13 times, Deir Zahrani 11 times, Harouf 10 times, and Jbechit, Zrariyeh, and Burj al-Shamali nine times each. Cities including Tyre and Nabatieh were also repeatedly ordered to evacuate, until the prospect of return itself risked becoming an idea with no land left to hold it.

Here, the apparent target is not confined to a single building. It extends to the social and human fabric bound to the place itself.

C- Warning Bundles: Engineering Panic Wholesale and Retail

Do warnings arrive one by one, village after village, or in clusters that encompass entire areas at once? At the level of distinct announcements, the pattern is clear: 120 announcements concerned a single location, while 108 announcements covered multiple locations simultaneously. The largest collective warning, issued on the third day of the war, included 56 areas, with an average of roughly nine locations per collective announcement.

Although these collective announcements were fewer in number than single-location warnings, they generated 89 per cent of all documented evacuation cases.




Chart 5 — Fewer Bundles, Most Evacuations — Up to 56 Areas in a Single Warning

What happens when twenty neighboring villages, or five neighborhoods in Beirut's southern suburbs, are warned in the same minute? The data points to three immediate effects:

- **Logistical paralysis:** thousands of people taking to the roads at once can create severe congestion, obstruct ambulances and rescue teams, and limit the ability of emergency plans to respond.
- **Collective panic:** individual fear may be manageable, but seeing neighbors and residents of nearby villages fleeing through the dark can turn it into mass panic. A collective warning creates a sense of powerlessness and begins to erode the possibility of staying even before any building is struck.
- **Geographic fragmentation:** emptying connected areas creates vacant spaces and corridors that are easier to monitor or control by fire, and may disrupt lines of movement, communication, or defense between areas.

إنذار عاجل إلى سكان لبنان وتحديدًا في القرى التالية:

التميرية، البابلية، المروانية، الكفور - تول (النبطية)، كفر بدا (صور)،
مزرعة كثرة الرز، مزرعة كفر جور، كفرونة، مزرعة اليهودية، مزرعة
الواسطه، مزرعة الحسينية، العاقية، مزرعة جمجم، مطرية
الشومر، عيا (النبطية)، غسانية، أنصار (النبطية)، مزرعة الداودية،
الدوير، خرطوم، عدوسية، دير تقلال، عدلون، تفاعت، اللوية،
صرفند، مراح الحباس، مزرعة اللوساميات، انصارية، البيسارية، زفتا،
مزرعة بصفور، قعقعية الصنوبر، زراية، دوير، مصيلح، تجارية،
سكسكية، الشرقية، مزرعة بصيلة، البياضة

أنشطة حزب الله تجبر جيش الدفاع على العمل
ضده بقوة في تلك المناطق. جيش الدفاع لا
يتوي المساس بكم.

حرصًا على سلامتكم عليكم إخلاء منازلكم فورًا
والانتقال إلى شمال نهر الزهراني.

D- “Immediately”: The Word that Undermines Effectiveness

If the human-rights implications of this dataset could be reduced to a single word, it would be

“immediately.” Every recorded evacuation order, from “evacuate your homes immediately and move one thousand meters away” to “evacuate the designated building and the surrounding buildings immediately”, requires people to leave at once.




Chart 6 — Required Action for Residents — No Shelter, No Safe Route

No time frame is given in hours. No clear deadline is set. No exception is made for sick people, older persons, or persons with disabilities. And where destinations are mentioned, they are not shelters or reception centers, but broad directions: open ground, north of the Zahrani River, towards the Sidon District, and similar formulations. In some cases, no destination is given at all.

Then comes the harsher paradox. 65 cases contain orders moving in the exact opposite direction, such as: “Do not move south of the designated line of villages until further notice.” A further 8 cases concern the declaration of security zones or restrictions on access.

The same system that drives residents from their homes restricts their movement elsewhere. Displacement is imposed in one place and prohibited in another. In both cases, residents are denied any meaningful choice over their own movement.

Measured against the two elements identified by Sweidan as essential to an effective warning, a “genuine opportunity to leave” and the provision of “safe routes or sufficient time”, the data does not reveal a single case in which all of these elements were present together.

E- The Warning After the “Truce”: Barring Return as Continuing Displacement

Perhaps the most painful finding in the data emerges not during the days of bombardment, but during the days of “truce.” On April 17, a ceasefire announcement was issued that also instructed residents, in the same text, not to move south of the Litani River until further notice. Three days later, on April 20, a list of 59 villages was published, barring residents from entering or returning to them. The restrictions stretched from Naqoura to Khiam and were accompanied by a ban on

approaching the Litani riverbed and Wadi al-Sluki.

The figures show the scale of this shift. Over just ten days, between April 17 and 26, 66 orders restricting movement or return were recorded. These orders reshaped the composition of the month: movement restrictions accounted for 32 per cent of all warning cases recorded in April, compared with only seven cases in March and May combined.




Chart 7 — Monthly Breakdown of Warnings — April: The “Truce” Month Turns into Restricted Movement and Blocked Return

The “truce” therefore did not bring the warning system to an end. It changed its function: from driving people into displacement to preventing them from returning. Those who had fled under the pressure of an evacuation warning found, once the ceasefire was announced, another warning closing the road home.

The dataset ends at the point where the pattern becomes complete. On June 18, the final entry was not an evacuation order, but the declaration of a “security zone” covering seven border towns: Khiam, Adaisseh, Qantara, Beit Lif, Talousa, Kfar Kila, and Majdal Selm. The sequence is clear: evacuation by warning, then the barring of return by warning, followed by the imposition of a new security reality by warning. Land emptied of its residents under the stated pretext of protecting them from danger was placed beyond their reach through an official declaration.

This is the sequence on which attorney Farouk Moghrabi relies in arguing that the warnings were used in practice as a means of forced displacement. Forced displacement is not merely a political description. International humanitarian law prohibits the forced evacuation of civilians except where required for their own safety or by imperative military necessity, and only on a temporary basis. It also gives rise to a right of return that cannot simply be allowed to lapse or be traded away.

When a ban on return ceases to be temporary and becomes an enduring reality administered through warnings and security orders, the original evacuation loses what remained of its claim to be a precautionary measure.

This assessment is no longer confined to the analysis presented in this report: Amnesty International⁶ has accused Israel of committing the war crime of “unlawful transfer of population” in southern Lebanon through the repeated use of mass evacuation orders and restrictions on return.

Constitutional law expert Dr. Jihad Ismail, speaking to the “Inbaa” website, identifies three legal foundations for this assessment: Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949)⁷ classifies unlawful transfer of population as a grave breach of the Convention. Article 85 of the First Additional Protocol (1977) elevates grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and the Protocol to the status of war crimes. Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)⁸ explicitly lists unlawful transfer among war crimes applicable in international armed conflict.

As for military necessity, Ismail argues that it cannot justify evacuation orders covering extensive areas without a clear connection to specific military operations, nor can it justify turning a limited and temporary evacuation into a prolonged ban on return. The exception permitted under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention⁹ is conditioned on evacuation being temporary and limited in scope. Invoking a suspected weapons depot or military target cannot, therefore, justify ordering the evacuation of vast areas.

This interpretation converges with what the data shows: locations warned repeatedly without any military operation following, and warnings directed at broad areas rather than specific targets.

When such a pattern is repeatedly directed at a particular segment of the population, it may raise concerns extending beyond individual violations towards the possibility of ethnic cleansing, stripping the practice of any legal, moral, or humanitarian justification.

6- “How Lawful Is the Evacuation Warning?” <https://shorturl.at/DGWiS>

7- Text of Article 147: The grave breaches referred to in the preceding Article shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; unlawful deportation or transfer; unlawful confinement; compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile power, or depriving them of the right to a fair and regular trial as prescribed by this Convention; taking hostages; and extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. <https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/arab/b093.html>

8- [https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/arabic/rome_statute\(a\).pdf](https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/arabic/rome_statute(a).pdf)

9- <https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/arab/b093.html>

Conclusion

From Psychological Engineering and Legal Legitimization to Redrawing Geography by Fire

A deep gulf separates the moral claims advanced in official military narratives from the reality lived on the ground. Within that gulf, the “military warning” is transformed from a measure ostensibly designed to protect life into a devastating psychological weapon. Publicly, it is presented as a virtue and as proof of the “humanity” of the confrontation. To the civilian receiving it, however, it can feel like an immediate death sentence, forcing an impossible decision within minutes: pack an entire lifetime into a single bag, or remain and face the destruction of memory and place.

This systematic compression of time is not merely a technical constraint. It serves a deliberate function: paralyzing rational thought and replacing it with the instinct to survive, thereby eroding the will to remain from within. More troubling still is the enlistment of this discourse in psychological warfare. Displacement is recast as a “favor,” an opportunity supposedly granted to the victim, while those unable or unwilling to leave their homes are made to bear the moral blame for what follows. The ethical balance is overturned, both within society and in the wider world, and the repeated collective farewell to villages and neighborhoods ceases to be an exceptional event. It becomes a daily ritual that consumes the very certainty of return.

Alongside this psychological pressure, contemporary military strategies construct legal narratives designed to shield them from international accountability. Article 57 is invoked and reshaped until it becomes a shield behind which responsibility for bloodshed and destruction is washed away in advance. This procedural architecture rests on a stark equation: anyone who remains only minutes after an evacuation order is issued is treated as though they have forfeited protection. As the two legal interviews make clear, this is a complete inversion of the spirit of international humanitarian law.

An “immediate” warning issued to a neighborhood crowded with thousands of people cannot reasonably be regarded as effective in the sense defined by Sweidan. Instead, it becomes bureaucratic groundwork for legitimizing the destruction of place and for shifting the burden of protection from the attacker onto the victim. In doing so, it provides the military machine with a veneer of legal formality under which infrastructure and entire residential blocks may be destroyed without consequence.

At the geopolitical level, the warnings reach beyond temporary evacuation. In practice, they become a territorial instrument for redrawing borders and carving out space by emptying it of its population. This became visible in the gradual advance of the evacuation lines: from barring access to areas south of the Litani River, to imposing a wider cordon pushing civilians beyond the Zahrani River, and finally to the “security zone” declared on June 18.

This advance creates facts on the ground by force. Entire areas are isolated and turned into empty buffer strips. By the time negotiations begin, the negotiator is confronted with land stripped of

its human identity and villages levelled to the ground. The right of return is then at risk of being transformed from a fixed legal principle into a bargaining chip, an item to be traded in exchange for concessions.

The Soft Face of a Hideous Weapon

After this analysis, it is difficult to regard advance warnings as merely logistical notices. The figures point to something else: 88 per cent of documented cases involved geographic evacuation; warnings were repeatedly concentrated on locations in Beirut's southern suburbs while villages in the south were emptied one after another; collective announcements covered dozens of areas at once and generated nearly nine out of every ten evacuation cases; the word "immediately" appeared at the start of every evacuation order, undermining the requirement of effectiveness; the first month of the "truce" became a system for restricting return; and the dataset ended with a "security zone" imposed over seven border towns. This is a doctrine that does not merely target place; it erases it.

The pattern recalls Sun Tzu's strategic logic: breaking the will without direct confrontation, through fear, displacement, and collective panic. At the same time, humanitarian law is turned against itself, used to provide cover for widespread destruction and for the remaking of territorial realities. Yet the law, despite the limits of its provisions, retains a clear answer: a warning does not absolve the attacker, remaining does not condemn the civilian, and the right of return cannot be extinguished by declaration.

In contemporary urban warfare, destruction does not begin only when a missile strikes its target. It may begin the moment the warning arrives, before the air-raid sirens are heard.

Appendix: Warning Distribution Tables

The following tables are arranged according to the official administrative division (governorate, then district). Duplicate spellings of the same town were merged, while each district's total warning count was kept unchanged.

Table 1: Summary of Warnings by Governorate and District (total of 1,097 warnings of all types; March–June 2026).

Governorate	District	Number of Villages / Locations	Total Warnings
Nabatieh	Nabatieh	40	200
	Bint Jbeil	33	110
	Marjayoun	25	67
	Hasbaya	3	9
South	Tyre	77	283
	(Sidon (Zahrani	41	131
	Jezzine	16	45
	(Baabda (Southern Suburb	8	152
Mount Lebanon	Aley	1	1
	Matn	1	4
Beirut	(Beirut (Capital Neighborhoods	3	5
	West Bekaa	11	40
Bekaa	Rachaya	1	3
	Zahle	1	1
Baalbek-Hermel	Baalbek	14	18
	Hermel	1	1
Unspecified	General Areas and Roads Not Administratively Specified	10	27
Grand Total		administrative districts 17	286
			1,097

Table 2 — Village-level detail (unified, by district)

Nabatieh District (40 locations, 200 warnings)		Nabatieh District (40 locations, 200 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count	Village / Location	Count
Habbouch	13	Al-Numeiriyeh	4
Deir al-Zahrani	11	Toul	4
Harouf	10	Kfar Tebnit	4
Arabsalim	10	Nabatieh	3
Jibsheet	9	Braiqaa	3
Homine el-Fawqa	9	Roumine	3
Yohmor al-Shaqif	8	Zawtar al-Sharqiyeh	3
Nabatieh al-Tahta	7	Al-Sharqiyeh	2
Kaakaaiyet al-Jisr	7	Zefta	2
Kfarremen	7	Shoukine	2
Arnoun	6	Sir al-Gharbiyeh	2
Al-Duwayr	6	Kfarfila	2
Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh	6	Kfarwa	2
Kfarjouz	6	Mazraat Bsafour	2
Al-Qusaibeh	5	Mazraat Sinay	2
Nabatieh al-Fawqa	5	Al-Jadida (Ansar)	1
Zebdine	5	Homine el-Tahta	1
Abba	5	Total	200
Adchit al-Shaqif	5		
Kfarsir	5	Bint Jbeil District (33 locations, 110 warnings)	
Maifadoun	5	Village / Location	Count
Ansar	4	Shaqra	7
Al-Kfour	4	Kfardounine	7

Bint Jbeil District (33 locations, 110 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Yater	7
Beit Lif	6
Hadatha	6
Khirbet Selm	6
Qlawiyeh	6
Beit Yahoun	5
Jmeijmeh	5
Faroun	5
Al-Sultaniyeh	4
Burj Qalawiyeh	4
Bint Jbeil	4
Al-Ghandouriyeh	3
Bar'ashit	3
Bir al-Sanasel	3
Hanin	3
Sarbine	3
Safad al-Battikh	3
Kafra	3
Hariss	2
Deir Antar	2
Aitaroun	2
Ainata	2
Tibnin	1
Ramyeh	1
Tiri	1
Aita al-Jabal	1
Aita al-Jabal (al-Zatel)	1
Aita al-Shaab	1
Qalaat Dweir	1
Maroun al-Ras	1
Yaroun	1
Total	110

Marjayoun District (25 locations, 67 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Majdal Selm	6
Qabrikha	5
Khiam	4
Al-Sawaneh	4
Touline	4
Marjayoun	4
Ebel es-Saqi	3
Blida	3
Houla	3
Deir Mimas	3
Taloussa	3
Meiss al-Jabal	3
Taybeh	2
Adaisseh	2
Al-Qantara	2
Bani Hayyan	2
Debbine	2
Deir Siriane	2
Rab Thalatheen	2
Kfar Kila	2
Markaba	2
Al-Tumriyeh	1

Marjayoun District (25 locations, 67 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Blat	1
Adchit al-Qusair	1
Mhaibib	1
Total	67

Hasbaya District (3 locations, 9 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Al-Mari	3
Ain Qinya	3
Kfar Shouba	3
Total	9

Tyre District (77 locations, 283 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Tyre	15
Burj al-Shamali	12
Al-Mashouk	11
Zouqouq al-Mafdi	11
Al-Abbasiyeh	8
Shabriha	8
Sarifa	8
Majdal Zoun	8
Al-Rashidiyeh	7
Arzoun	6
Al-Bass	6
Al-Hamadiyeh	6
Al-Hosh	6
Deb'aal	6
Deir Qanoun al-Nahr	6
Zebqine	6
Ain Baal	6
Qana	6
Mazraat Byout al-Siyad	6
Maaroub	6
Bazouriyeh	5
Al-Halouisyeh	5
Al-Shihabiyeh	5
Al-Majadel	5
Deir Kifa	5
Jall al-Bahr	4
Deir Aamess	4
Sedqine	4
Tair Debba	4
Tair Falsay	4
Al-Bayada	3
Al-Samaiyeh	3
Al-Mansouri	3
Bareesh	3
Burj Rahhal	3
Jibal al-Botm	3
Jnata	3
Dardaghya	3
Sal'a	3
Shhour	3
Toura	3
Mahroneh	3
Mazraat Jamjam	3
Maaraka	3

Tyre District (77 locations, 283 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Wadi Jilo	3
Al-Humairi	2
Bafliyah	2
Badyas	2
Bustiyat	2
Jisr al-Qassamiyeh	2
Aytit	2
Mazraat al-Yahoudiyeh	2
Abramine	1
Al-Barghaliyeh	1
Al-Jbain	1
Al-Jarba	1
Al-Haniyeh	1
Al-Haniyeh al-Qalileh	1
Al-Ramadiyeh	1
Al-Shaaityeh	1
Al-Dhahira	1
Al-Qulaileh	1
Naqoura	1
Al-Nafakhiyeh	1
Jabal al-Zaarour	1
Jouaiya	1
Hanawiyeh	1
Rashkananiyeh	1
Shiheen	1
Tair Harfa	1
Zahr Bariyet Jaber	1
Alma al-Shaab	1
Marwahin	1
Mazraat Bsayleh	1
Matmoura	1
Yarine	1
Yanouh	1
Total	283

Sidon (Zahrani) District (41 locations, 131 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Al-Zrariyeh	12
Al-Kharayeb	8
Al-Marwaniyeh	7
Al-Ansariyeh	6
Mazraat Kawthariyet al-Rez	6
Arzai	5
Sarafand	5
Al-Ghassaniyeh	5
Bin Aafoul	5
Tefahta	5
Kaakaaiyet al-Sanawbar	5
Al-Babliyah	4
Al-Bisariyeh	4
Al-Aaqbiyeh	4
Arkeh	3
Al-Siksikiyeh	3
Arab al-Jal	3
Mazraat al-Wasta	3
Matariyet al-Shoumar	3
Al-Adousiyeh	2
Al-Loubiyeh	2

Sidon (Zahrani) District (41 locations, 131 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Al-Najjariyeh	2
Harit Saida	2
Adloun	2
Ezzeh	2
Anqoun	2
Qnaireet	2
Kfarbida	2
Kfarhatta	2
Kfarmalki	2
Kawthariyet al-Siyad	2
Mazraat al-Dawoudiyeh	2
Al-Musayleh	1
Khirbet Basal	1
Khartoum	1
Deir Taqla	1
Sniber	1
Kfarbeit	1
Kfarshallal	1
Mazraat al-Awsamiyat	1
Mazraat al-Husseiniyeh	1
Total	131

Jezzine District (16 locations, 45 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Ain Qana	6
Kfarhouneh	6
Sojod	5
Jarjouaa	4
Mleikh	4
Al-Rihan	3
Jbaa	3
Armata	3
Al-Loueizeh	2
Al-Mahmoudiyeh	2
Jarnaya	2
Al-Qatrani	1
Shbeel	1
Sarba	1
Ain Bousswar	1
Marah al-Hbass	1
Total	45

Baabda (Southern Suburb) District (8 locations, 152 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Haret Hreik	28
Hadath	22
Ghobeiry	22
Burj al-Barajneh	22
Chiyah	20
Laylakeh	19
Tahwitat al-Ghadir	18
Jnah	1
Total	152

Aley District (1 location, 1 warning)	
Village / Location	Count
Choueifat al-Amroussiyyeh	1

Aley District (1 location, 1 warning)	
Village / Location	Count
Total	1

Matn District (1 location, 4 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Naba'a	4
Total	4

Beirut (Capital Neighborhoods) District (3 locations, 5 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Bachoura	2
Basta	2
Zoqaq al-Blat	1
Total	5

West Bekaa District (11 locations, 40 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Sohmor	8
Machghara	6
Dalafi	4
Qlaiaa	4
Labbaya	4
Meidoun	4
Yohmor (West Bekaa)	4
Zalaya	3
Jisr al-Dalafeh	1
Sohmor-Machghara Bridges	1
Ain al-Tineh	1
Total	40


Rachaya District (1 location, 3 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Ain Ata	3
Total	3

Zahle District (1 location, 1 warning)	
Village / Location	Count
Masnaa Crossing	1
Total	1

Baalbek District (14 locations, 18 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
Al-Kniseh	3
Douris	3
Al-Khodr	1
Al-Labweh	1
Al-Nabi Sheet	1
Bednayel	1
Brital	1
Hosh al-Rafqa	1
Hosh al-Ghanam	1
Saraain al-Tahta	1
Saraain al-Fawqa	1
Ain Bourday	1
Qasarnaba	1
Majdaloun	1
Total	18

Hermel District (1 location, 1 warning)	
Village / Location	Count
Hermel	1
Total	1

General Areas and Roads Not Administratively Specified (10 locations, 27 warnings)	
Village / Location	Count
South Lebanon (south of the Zahrani River)	10
South Lebanon (south of the Litani River)	4
Lebanon (general)	4
South Lebanon (general – south of the Zahrani River)	2
Multiple (combined page)	2
Sea waters between Tyre and Ras al-Naqoura	1
Litani River Bridges	1
South Lebanon (multiple villages)	1
South Lebanon – Restricted Villages List	1
Forward Defense Zone (South Lebanon)	1
Total	27



Warnings: Death's Gifts Wrapped in Life